Business and Commerical Law: Business Associations by Bennett, Dale E.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 7 | Number 2
The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the
1945-1946 Term
January 1947
Business and Commerical Law: Business
Associations
Dale E. Bennett
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Dale E. Bennett, Business and Commerical Law: Business Associations, 7 La. L. Rev. (1947)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol7/iss2/10
1947] THE WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT 257
Since the leading case of Knispel v. Gulf States Utilities
Company"9 the supreme court has adhered faithfully to the posi-
tion that a skilled workman is to be regarded as being totally
disabled when he is rendered unable to do work of a character
reasonably similar to that performed prior to the accident, even
though he may demonstrate his ability to earn a substantial
amount at some other calling. This position is not only eminently
fair in view of the compromise character of workmen's compen-
sation, but offers the additional advantage of being simpler to
administer than any competing interpretation. This position was
reaffirmed recently in Ranatza v. Higgins Industries."° Prior to
the accident plaintiff's wage as a skilled carpenter averaged
$62.50 per week. Thereafter he was able to earn an average of
$30.00 per week as part time bus driver. The court refused to
regard the disability as partial only. It is perhaps noteworthy that
the net effect of a contrary ruling would have been only to reduce
the maximum period of compensation from four hundred weeks
to three hundred weeks, since the amount of compensation to be
awarded under either view would exceed the permissible twenty
dollar maximum.
V. BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL LAW
BUSINESS AsSOCIATIONS
Dale E. Bennett*
Ostensible Authority of President of Corporation
The general rule is frequently stated that the president-di-
rector of a corporation is merely presiding officer of the board
of directors. He has no more authority than any other director
in the management of corporate affairs-a matter which is under
the control and responsibility of the entire board.1 However,
there is a tendency in modern business to put the president in
general charge of business, with the result that courts have fre-
quently held that he has, at least prima facie, authority of a
general manager to conduct the ordinary, everyday business of
the corporation.2 Even where the strict rule prevails, the presi-
39. 174 La. 401, 141 So. 9 (1932).
40. 208 La. 198, 23 So.(2d) 45 (1945).
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Knopf v. Alma Park, Inc., 105 N. J. Eq. 299, 147 AtI. 590 (1929).
2. Schwartz v. United Merchants & Manufacturers, Inc., 72 F. (2d) 256
(C. C. A. 2d, 1934).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
dent's acts may bind the corporation by reason of acquiescence
of the directors in a known exercise or assumption of power.$
In Ideal Savings & Homestead Association v. Kernere the
Louisiana Supreme Court relied largely on the doctrine of os-
tensible authority in upholding an unauthorized sale of land by
the president, and ostensible general manager, of a homestead
association. The purchaser had reasonably relied upon the presi-
dent's apparent authority to sell. The board of directors had
actually authorized the advertisement of the property for sale,
and the members of the board were cognizant of the fact that its
real estate agent submitted the offers received to the president
for acceptance, rejection or counter-offer. The association's no-
tary public who passed the document, and its attorney who
cleared the title, were both members of the board of directors.
The association secretary testified that the president conducted
the homestead's affairs. A board resolution had given its execu-
tive officer general authority to receive funds. In view of all of
these circumstances, the association was estopped to deny the
president's authority in the premises, even though he had failed
to turn the proceeds over to the association. Justice Higgins very
appropriately applied the general equitable maxim that "where
one of two innocent parties must suffer loss through the fraud
of another, the burden of loss should be imposed on him who
most contributed to it."
'5
Corporate Shareholders' Rights
The decision in State v. Boylan's Private Police' was depen-
dent upon a rather complex factual question as to whether the
relator, Boylan, Jr., had paid for the 253 shares of common stock
in defendant corporation which had originally been issued in his
name and later cancelled. If the stock had been paid for, Boylan,
Jr., would have been entitled to have the stock re-issued to him,
and would then have had much more than the "two per cent
of all outstanding stock" which was a legal prerequisite to his
asserted right to inspect the corporate books.7 However, the facts
of the case did not sustain Boylan, Jr.'s, alleged right to the
stock, and the court denied his petition that the corporation
should be required to re-issue the stock and to permit him, as
3. Grant v. Duluth, M & N Ry. Co., 66 Minn. 349, 67 N. W. 23 (1896).
4. 208 La. 513, 23 So. (2d) 200 (1945).
5. 208 La. 513, 520, 23 So. (2d) 200, 203.
6. 208 La. 499, 23 So. (2d) 196 (1945).
7. La. Bus. Corp. Act of 1928, § 38, III, as amended by La. Act 34 of 1935
(4 E.S.) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1118].
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such shareholder, to inspect the corporate books and records.
The corporation had been formed to continue the business of
Boylan's Protective Police, a failing partnership which had al-
ways been operated by the Boylan family. A majority of the
common stock in the newly formed corporation was placed in
the names of the two sons of Boylan, Sr., but solely for con-
venience. It was the general understanding that if the new cor-
poration became sound financially, the stock should be re-issued
in equal proportions to Boylan, Sr., his wife, Boylan, Jr., and the
other son. All the shares were pledged to Muller to secure an
advance of money that put the business on a secure financial
basis. When the loan was repaid, the returned pledged stock
(including Boylan, Jr.'s) was cancelled. Looking to the real ar-
rangement of the parties, the court held that Boylan, Jr., could
not insist upon his ostensible right to a return of the pledged
stock. The court was not impressed with Boylan, Jr.'s, contention
that he had paid for the shares by monetary advances made to
the corporation. The so-called advances appeared to have origi-
nated in family property and funds; and, even if they could be
considered as from Boylan, Jr., individually, it was clear that
they were made to get the family business in running order, and
not in payment for the original issuance of stock to him. The
affairs of the Boylan family corporation had been very loosely
handled, but Justice Hawthorne did a remarkable job of apprais-
ing Boylan, Jr.'s, inherent equities arising out of the astonish-
ingly complex affairs of so small a corporation. In essence, the
court concluded that it was never intended between the parties
that Boylan, Jr., should become the real owner of the 253 shares,
and that if such had been the intent, the shares were properly
cancelled for nonpayment.' Fortunately, no rights of third parties
had intervened to further complicate the situation.
Indicia of a Partnership
The articles of the Civil Code do not provide a very exact
definition of a partnership. This is due in part to the nature of
the concept involved, and also to the somewhat conflicting phrase-
ology of the pertinent codal articles. Article 2801 defines partner-
ship as "a synallagmatic and commutative contract made be-
tween two or more persons for the mutual participation in the
profits which may accrue from property, credit, skill or industry,
furnished in determined proportions by the parties." This defi-
nition is qualified by the statement in Article 2805 that "partner-
8. La. Bus. Corp. Act of 1928, § 6, II and IV.
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ships must be created by the consent of the parties." While mu-
tual participation in profits is a very important consideration, this
circumstance does not necessarily and invariably establish a
partnership. In a last analysis "the real meaning and intention
of the parties, as expressed in their contract" is controlling.9
The partnership is a contractual relation, and other elements or
circumstances are important only insofar as they serve to indi-
cate the real intention of the parties. In Glover v. Mayer"0 an
arrangement between two parties whereby one undertook the
management and operation of a plantation, the other financed
the project, and both were to share equally in the net profits and
apparently in the losses, was not, without more, sufficient to es-
tablish a partnership agreement. In so holding the Louisiana
Supreme Court stressed the fact that a partnership is a contrac-
tual arrangement dependent upon the intent of the parties. A
sharing of both profits and losses will ordinarily indicate 'that
the parties intended to enter into a partnership arrangement.
Apparently the Glover case holds that the sharing of profits and
losses, unaccompanied by any additional circumstances pointing
either way, does not establish an intent to create a partnership.
Again, the holding in that case might easily be limited to an
agreement to share profits. The report does not specifically indi-
cate that the right of the person operating the plantation to share
in the profits, included a correlative obligation to share in any
losses which might occur. If such is the case, the opinion is only
authority for the generally recognized proposition that sharing
of profits, without more, does not establish a partnership. The
effect of an agreement to share both profits and losses is one
which has given Louisiana courts considerable trouble. The in-
stant case and the authorities cited would tend to show that the
intention of the parties to create a partnership must be clearly es-
tablished, and that it is not safe to generalize that the sharing of
profits and losses establishes a prima facie case that the parties
intended a partnership. Other indicia of a partnership are mutual
agency powers and mutual capital contribution. Where neither
of these latter indicia, nor other significant circumstances are
present, the intention to form a partnership is not sufficiently
established.
9. Chaffraix & Agar v. Lafltte & Co., 30 La. Ann. 631 (1878), where a
sharing of both profits and losses did not result in the creation of a part-
nership.
10. 209 La. 599, 25 So. (9,J '........ following Chaffraix &
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